decline of the ICC and the probable and desirable future position of this agency.
Successful adaptation to changing environmental circumstances is the secret of health and longevity for administrative as well as biological organisms. Every government agency must reflect to some degree the "felt needs" of its time. In the realm of government, felt needs are expressed through political demands and political pressures. These demands and pressures may come from th6 president, other administrative agencies and officials, congressmen, political interest groups, and the general public. If an agency is to be viable it must adapt itself to the pressures from these sources so as to maintain a net preponderance of political support over political opposition. 10 It must have sufficient support to maintain and, if necessary, expand its statutory authority, to protect it against attempts to abolish it or subordinate it to other agencies, and to secure for it necessary appropriations. Consequently, to remain viable over a period of time, an agency must adjust its sources of support so as to correspond with changes in the strength of their political pressures. If the agency fails to make this adjustment, its political support decreases relative to its political opposition, and it may be said to suffer from administrative marasmus.' 1 The decline of the ICC may be attributed to its susceptibility to this malady.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of the ICC in terms of its political support divides naturally into two fairly distinct periods. The Commission was created in 1887 after the Supreme Court invalidated state attempts to regulate the railroads' abuse of their monopoly power.' 2 The driving force behind these early state regulatory laws and commissions were the farmers, who had suffered severely from exorbitant rates and discriminatory practices. This group plus equally dissatisfied commercial shippers were the political force responsible for the Act policy within the Executive Branch of Government. He supervises the activities of the Office of Transportation which has been established to assist him in the performance of his duties." The Undersecretary is authorized to (1) exercise general policy guidance over all transportation activities in the Department, (2) assure program consistency among the transportation 'agencies in the Department, (3) carry out the powers delegated to the Secretary to coordinate the transportation policies and program of the government especially as related to mobilization, (4) initiate action and appear before regulatory commissions when matters affecting overall transportation policies are under consideration. 16 FEB. REG. 8189-90 (1951) .
10. For thorough discussion of agency support theory, see SIM N, SMITBnuRG, & THoMPsoN, PUBLic ADMINISTRATION cc. 18, 19 (1950) ; Long, Power and Admnitiration, 9 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 257-64 (1949) ; TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PRocEss (1951).
11. "ma-ras'-mus . . . n. Pathol. A gradual and continuous wasting away of the bulk of the body from some morbid cause. [Gr. marasows, maraino, waste] From 1887 down to the First World War the support of the Commission came primarily from the groups responsible for its creation. Opposition came principally from the railroads and the courts. In its first two decades the Commission was severely hampered by the combined action of these two groups.'
5 Subsequently farmer and shipper interests with the vigorous support of President Roosevelt secured the passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906. This enlarged the Commission, extended its jurisdiction, gave it the power to prescribe future maximum rates, and prohibited railroads from owning the products they transported. The decade which followed the passage of this Act was the peak of the Commission's power and prestige while still dependent upon consumer, public and presidential support.' 0 The end of the First World War marked a definite change in the nature of the transportation problem and in the attitudes of the various interests towards railroad regulation. The vigorous actions of the ICC in the period immediately prior to the war had eliminated the worst discriminatory practices and had convinced the railroads that the path of wisdom was to accept regulation and to learn to live with the Commission. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) ; Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457 (1918) .
17. This policy had been advocated sometime earlier in the .1890's by a far-sighted industrial statesman, Richard Olney, who predicted that the ICC would become "a sort of barrier between the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests' Quoted in JosEP'nou, TUe Pouricos 526 (1938) . 1952] of the carriers consequently reduced the interest and political activity of shipper groups. And increased urbanization reduced the power of farm groups which had been such a significant source of support to the Commission. Finally, "normalcy" had supplanted progressivism and I-larding and Coolidge were significantly different from T. Roosevelt and Wilson. Consequently there was little likelihood that restrictive regulation would find much support from either the public or the White House.
All these factors dictated not only the shift in public policy which was made in the Transportation Act of 1920 but also a shift by the Commission in the sources to which it looked for support.'
8 Continued reliance upon the old sources of support would have resulted in decreasing viability. Therefore the Commission turned more and more to the railroad industry itself, particularly the railroad management group. This development was aided by the expansion of the Commission's activities and the resulting increased dependence of the Commission upon the cooperation of regulated groups for the successful administration of its program. 19 The support which the Commission received from the railroads sustained it down to World War II and enabled it both to expand its authority over other carrier groups and to defend itself against attempts to subject it to executive control.
The present marasmus of the ICC is due to continued dependence upon railroad support. The transportation industry is not only large, it is also dynamic. Technological changes and economic development are basically altering the nation's transportation pattern. The tremendous expansion of air and motor transport, the resulting increase in competition, the economic development of the South and West, the rise of private carriage, and the increased significance of defense considerations all make today's transportation system fundamentally different from that of twenty-five years ago. These technological and economic developments have given rise to new political demands and pressures, and have drastically altered the old balance of political forces in the transportation arena. A quarter of a century ago commercial transportation was railroad transportation. Today, railroads are a declining, although still major, segment of the transportation industry. Their economic decline has been matched by a decrease in political influence. The ICC, however, remains primarily a "railroad" agency. It has not responded to the demands of the new forces in transportation. It has not duplicated the successful adjustment of its sources of political support that it carried out after World War I. Consequently, it is losing its leadership to those agencies which are more responsive to the needs and demands of the times.
II. RAILROAD SUPPORT OF THE ICC

Railroad Praise of the ICC
The attitude of the railroads towards the Commission since 1935 can only be described as one of satisfaction, approbation, and confidence. At times the railroads have been almost effusive in their praise of the Commission. The ICC, one sub-committee of the Association of rAmerican Railroads has declared, "is eminently qualified by nearly sixty years of experience to handle transportation matters with a maximum of satisfaction to management, labor and the public.
-" 2 0 Another representative of the same association has similarly stated that " [w] hat is needed for the solution of the tremendously important problems of transport regulation is the impartiality, deliberation, expertness, and continuity of policy that have marked the history of the Interstate Commerce Commission."
21 Railroad officials and lawyers have commended the Commission as a "conspicuous success," a "constructive force," and as a "veteran and generally respected tribunal. 22 The American Short Line Railroad Association has commented upon the "fair, intelligent treatment" its members have been accorded by the Commission, and the Pennsylvania Railroad has been lavish in its praise of the latter's policies.
2 3 The ICC is probably the only regulatory body in the federal government which can boast that a book has been written about it by counsel for a regulated interest in order to demonstrate "how well" the Commission has "performed its duty." The staff study of the ICC for the Hoover Commission spoke of the attitude of the railroads as "one of respect and general Satisfaction with the Commission and its procedures, though carriers may be highly critical of and dissatisfied with particular The railroads and the Commission have both praised their harmonious relations. "The railroad industry," it has been said, "in wide contrast to other industry, has learned to live under government regulation. '25 The editors of Railway Age have similarly spoken highly of the "collaboration" which exists between the Commission and its regulated enterprises and have remarked that this "stands out in strong contrast to the animosity and distrust which now separates many regulatory bodies from the areas of industry which they supervise." 26 The Commission itself has noted with pride the lack of criticism which its adminstration of the Interstate Commerce Act has received from the carriers and has pointed out that while some interests have urged the abandonment of regulation the" "railroads have never joined in that suggestion."
27
Railroad Defense of Commission Independence
The railroads have vigorously defended the independence of the ICC from control by other governmental units and have opposed all attempts to subordinate it to other agencies or to transfer from the Commission any of its functions. This support for the Commission has taken three principal forms.
Opposition to ICC reorganization. The railroads have successfully opposed all reorganization proposals to subordinate the ICC or transfer any of its functions to the executive branch. In 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative Management recommended that the ICC along with all other regulatory commissions be divided into administrative and judicial sections and be placed in an executive department. The administrative section would be a regular bureau within the department; the judicial section would be in the department for "housekeeping" purposes only.
28 These proposals raised a storm of protest from the ICC-railroad bloc and legislation to effect them was defeated in Congress. 29 Over a decade later similar opposition was expressed by the railroads to legislation designed to create a Department of Transportation which would absorb the "executive" functions of the ICC. AGE 324 (Feb. 7, 1942 341-52 (1948. 49) .
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The Hoover Commission recommendations that the equipment inspection, safety, and car service functions of the Commission be transferred to the Department of Commerce were likewise opposed by the rail carriers.
3 1 In general, the railroads have repeatedly emphasized the desirability of maintaining the independence of the Commission against all forms of executive encroachment.m
The significance of railroad support for the Commission in this connection was perhaps best demonstrated by the fate of the presidential reorganization plan designed to centralize administrative authority within the Commission in a chairman appointed by the president. This plan was one of six, all submitted by the president at the same time, and devised to effectuate similar reforms in five other commissions as well as the ICC. Resolutions of disapproval of four of these plans were introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments.
3 3 This committee reported three of the resolutions unfavorably; the fourth, that disapproving of the ICC reorganization, was reported favorably. The explanation of this obviously inconsistent action (since all four plans were virtually identical) can, in the words of the minority report, "easily be found by reading the roster of the regulated interests (and their lawyers) which appeared in opposition. '34 The hearings on the plans had been largely monopolized by railroad and associated witnesses appearing to defend the "independence" of the ICC.TI In the debate on the floor of the Senate the railroads were given primary credit for the committee's peculiar action, and in the end the ICC resolution was approved by a substantial majority.
3
Railroad support saved the ICC from a reorganized fate to which five other commissions succumbed. Sess. 21 (1950) . The committee minority (Senators Humphrey, Leahy, and Benton) also described the preferential treatment given the ICC as a "high tribute to pressure-group tactics!' Sen. Res. 253, 254, 255, 256, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 53-89, 151-61, 171-7 (1950) ; SENt. No. 1567 , 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 21, n2 (1950 . Motor carrier representatives expressed qualified opposition to the proposal. Significantly, the water carriers, the other major carrier group regulated by the Commission, did not appear to oppose the reorganization.
COMMsSION
Hearings before Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments on
REP.
36. 96 CONG. Rzc. 7160-4, 7173 (1950) . The resolution of disapproval of the ICC reorganization plan was passed by a vote of 66 to 13. Five days later two similar resolutions concerning the FTC and FPC were defeated by votes of 34 to 37 and 37 to 36
Opposition to the creation of new agencies which might rival the ICC. Within the last decade the railroads have generally opposed the establishment of new agencies which might in any way infringe upon or limit the powers of the ICC. In 1938 the railroad Committee of Six did recommend the creation of a new transportation authority which would take over the Commission's powers in regard to finance, entry, and abandonment, and the establishment of a special court to handle railroad reorganizations.
3 7 Both recommendations, however, were opposed by numerous rail carriers and officials.a8 Typical of the usual railroad attitude was the rejection in 1946 by one Association of American Railroads group of the proposal for a new transportation planning body because apparently this "would provide another agency duplicating the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and further complicate a situation now made difficult by the intervening of various government departments."
39 Representatives of the AAR also opposed the creation of the new office of Undersecretary of Commerce for Transportation on the grounds that the ICC was the leading federal agency concerned with transportation and that this new official could only duplicate its functions and challenge its authority. 40 Similarly, railroad opposition to the creation of a Department of Transportation has in large part been based upon the fear that even if this body did not initially absorb the ICC it would eventually encroach upon the Commission's functions. 41 Railroads have frequently urged the creation of a single regulatory commission for all forms of transportation; the implicit or explicit assumption in all such proposals, however, is that this Commission would be an enlarged and reorganized ICC.
42
Opposition to the interference of existing agencies with the Comtmission. Attempts by existing agencies to influence or dictate ICC policy through intervention in proceedings before the Commission, informal pressure upon comrespectively (forty-nine affirmative votes being necessary to pass a resolution of disapproval). On the same day that the ICC plan was disapproved, however, the Senate also disapproved the reorganization of thd FCC by the narrow margin of two votes, 50 to 23, despite the unfavorable report of the resolution of disapproval by the Committee oil Executive Expenditures. While the majority of the Senate evidently felt the necessity of being consistent for at least the duration of one afternoon, eleven senators voted against the reorganization of the ICC and for the reorganization of the FCC. missioners, or by other means, have been severely attacked by the railroads. The argument is that the ICC has the responsibility to act in the public interest, and other agencies, if they interfere, must be doing so on behalf of some parochial interest. Appearances of the Secretary of Agriculture before the Commission have frequently been objected to, and the intervention of price control agencies in the general rate cases has likewise been attacked.
3
The heaviest criticism along this line has been directed at the Department of Justice for its frequent interventions before the ICC and attempts to influence Commission policy in cases raising antitrust issues. 44 On a much broader level, the railroads and associated groups have been staunch defenders of the independence of the Commission from presidential and congressional interference.
Railroad Support for the Expansion of ICC Power
In addition to defending the ICC against intrusions upon its powers by other agencies the railroads have fairly consistently in recent decades advocated the expansion of the Commission's authority. There are four principal points in the railroad program as it has developed.
Transfer Since 1941 the principal activity of the railroads in this area has been the drive to get the enforcement of the antitrust laws as applied to common carriers transferred from the Department of Justice to the ICC. The railroads argued that they were subject to two conflicting types of regulation and that the Antitrust Division was unfamiliar with and unsympathetic to their problems. In the end, the carriers were successful and the Reed-Bulwvinkle Act of 1948 gave the ICC power to exempt rate conferences and bureaus from the antitrust laws. ".. . there is substantially no demand for public regulation of the charges of motor trucks to protect shippers against exorbitant or discriminatory charges. The demand has been chiefly from the railroads, and for the prescription of minimum rather than maximum charges.
47
Yet the Commission in that year endorsed the regulation of motor carriers, and in succeeding years regularly gave its support to measures designed to achieve that end. 48 The recommendations of ICC Commissioner Eastman in his capacity as Federal Coordinator of Transportation gave additional impetus to the drive for regulation. 49 The strongest political support, however, came from the railroads themselves, and representatives of the Association of Railroad Executives actively participated in the drafting of motor carrier legislation." 0 The great bulk of the motor carriers initially opposed regulation. The approval of the American Trucking Associations was achieved only in the later stages after they had received assurances that enforcement of the new legislation would be placed in a separate ICC bureau completely divorced from the existing railroad-regulating bureaus."' Motor 47. 46 ICC ANN. REP. 20 (1932 (1935) . Motor carrier regulation had been supported from the start by a group of long-haul common carriers, Hearings on HR. 6836, supra, at 85-96, but this was not the position of the industry as a whole. The assurances which the ATA received from the ICC were subsequently gone back on by the Commission, see p. 498 infra.
[Vol. 61 :467 carrier regulation was also strongly opposed by all the principal farm organizations and most of the industrial shipper groups.
2
A comparable pattern prevailed in the struggle over the regulation of inland water carriers. The ICC, the Federal Coordinator, and the railroads strongly supported regulation.5 3 The farm organizations, the shippers, and the bulk of the water carriers themselves were equally strongly opposed.5 The strength of this latter combination was sufficient to delay the enactment of regulatory legislation until 1940 when the Transportation Act of that year gave the ICC control over these carriers.o
Since the achievement of these two major objectives of basic ICC control over water and motor carriers, the railroads have attempted to fill in the gaps left in the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. They have urged that the exemptions given motor carriers of agricultural commodities and water carriers of bulk commodities be removed, and that private carriage and contract carriers likewise be subjected to the authority of the ICC. Barge Lines and one or two other large common carriers were the only water carriers to support regulation and then only on the condition that the ICC be thoroughly reorganizezd. The alleged tendency of the Commission to "give paramount consideration to the needs of the railroads" was strongly attacked by Senator Shipstead. Smr. REP. No. 925, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 2 (1935); 79 CONG. Rrc 10694, 10727, 10749 (1935) . AAR has also urged in recent years that the Commission be given power to charge tolls for the use of the inland waterways.
7
Transfer of regulatory controls over railroad-competitive groups from other agencies to the ICC. Where the railroads have been unsuccessful in preventing the assignment to other agencies of regulatory functions over competing carriers they have waged prolonged campaigns for the transfer of these functions to the ICC. In the debates over the Transportation Act of 1940 the AAR urged that ICC authority be extended over all forms of transportation subject to federal regulation. In particular, the Association wished to transfer authority over coastwise and intercoastal shipping from the Maritime Commission to the ICC and to have the ICC assume the functions of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Legislation introduced at the instigation of the railroads contained these provisions.
5 8 The railroads were successful in achieving only the first of their objectives. Rail groups have subsequently regularly attacked the independent position of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and urged either its abolition and the transfer of its functions to the ICC or, in more general terms, the centralization of all regulatory activities affecting transportation in one agency.
59
Concentration of all federal transportation activities in the ICC. The culmination of these various railroad policies towards the expansion of ICC authority was reached in 1950 when the AAR advanced the position that all government activities-regulatory and promotional-affecting all forms of transportation should be placed in the ICC. The representative of the railroads testifying before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee was quite explicit in stating that such agencies as the Bureau of Public Roads should be under the Commission. He left some doubt, however, as to the extent to which this recommendation also included such transportation service agencies as the Coast Guard, Weather Bureau, and Coast and Geodetic Survey 0 In addition, the AAR advocated that the authority of the ICC be extended so that all projects for improving the inland waterways proposed by the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, be submitted to the ICC for approval before their transmission to Congress. 0 ' Insofar as the scope of its authority is concerned, no stronger support could be asked by the ICC than that which the Association of American Railroads has given to the Commission.
Railroad support in all its forms has been the basis of the Interstate Commerce Commission's viability. Other interests have at times supported individual actions of the Commission or defended the Commission against specific [Vol. 61:467 attempts to curb its authority. But such action on the part of these interests has always been sporadic and balanced by severe criticism of the Commission and opposition to it in other lines of policy. The railroads are alone among the interests surrounding the Commission in their constant and comprehensive support of that body. By their continuous praise of the Commission, by their defense of its independence and by their efforts to protect and to extend its authority the railroads have made the Commission the beneficiary of what has been their not inconsiderable political power. But in the rough world of competitive politics nothing comes for free. Political support must be purchased, and the price which the ICC has paid for its railroad support may be traced through almost all important phases of its policy and behavior.
Hearings on Donestic Land and
III. ICC AID TO THE RAILROADS
An exhaustive analysis of the ramifications of the ICC-railroad affiliation throughout Commission policy is obviously beyond the scope of this Article. Instead it is here proposed to indicate briefly the consequences of this affiliation in four major areas of Commission activity: (1) the level of rates and fares; (2) monopoly and antitrust; (3) rail-motor competition; (4) railwater competition.
The Level of Rates and Fares
The ease with which the railroads in recent years have obtained advances in rates and fares from the ICC has been the subject of considerable unfavorable comment.
6 2 The significance of this Commission acquiescence to railroad demands can only be appreciated by a comparison of ICC policy in this field before and after it became dependent upon railroad support. The Commission received the power to prescribe future maximum rates in the Hepburn Act of 1906.63 The first general request for rate advances came from the carriers in 1911 after the Mann-Elkins Act had broadened the Commission's powers in this area. These requests were denied, with the Commission laying down rigorous criteria for the justification of rate advances." During the next few years, in a series of general rate cases, the Commission either denied the railroad requests for increases or granted only a minor fraction of their demands. 
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and in general harmony with wholesale prices from 1908 through 1915.00 In 1916, however, wholesale prices started to skyrocket, and the railroads renewed their demands for rate advances. But the ICC remained adamant throughout 1917, and it was not until March 1918 that the railroads were able to secure any substantial relief." 7 ICC policy during this period directly reflects its shipper and farmer sources of political support.
08
In 1920, as its support from non-railroad sources was beginning to weaken, the Commission approved a major increase in railroad rates.0 9 After prices plummeted in 1921, freight rates were considerably out of line, and the Coinmission in 1922 ordered a ten per cent decrease3 0 Despite the pressure of agricultural interests, however, the Commission did not restore the prewar relationship between prices and rates. Instead, the Commission from 1924 through 1929 stabilized freight rates at about 165 % of the 1913 level, whereas prices had fallen back to about 140% of that level. It was during this period that the Commission lost its farmer and shipper support and developed close railroad affiliations. The changing attitudes of the former toward the Commission are reflected in the Hoch-Smith resolution of 1925, and the year 1926 marks the last time that the Commission denied in toto a railroad request for a general rate advance. CommIssIoN 83-98 (1936) ; General Order No. 28, United States Railroad Administration, dated May 25, 1918 , amended June 12, 1918 , effective June 25, 1918 68. "The Commission's active concern with the protection of the interests of shippers and users of transportation service was demonstrated in a series of important rate decisions between 1910 and 1917, in which the Commission in the main denied permission for the rate advances proposed by the railroads. These decisions were rendered in the face of tremendous pressure upon the Commission to grant the increases and in spite of marked increases in operating expenses, particularly towards the end of the period." FAINSOD & By the advent of the thirties the ICC was exercising a benevolent paternalism in regard to the rate level. Whereas in 1932 the wholesale price index had fallen off over 30% from its 1929 level, the Commission by granting "emergency" increases had actually slightly increased the level of freight rates.
3B SHARFAN, INTERSTATE COIMERCE
Throughout the depression the Commission maintained the rate level by approval of additional "emergency" increases and surcharges, by the rejection in 1933 of a shipper petition for rate reduction, and by the approval in 1938 of a general ten per cent rise.' The result was that freight rates never dropped more than eleven per cent from their 1929 level. When wholesale prices increased in the early forties, freight rates went up also: the price index for 1945 was 151.6 and the freight rate index 173.8. Thus from 1924 through 1945 the Commission was able to maintain the rate level well above the price level. The significant gap between wholesale prices and freight rates during this period is graphic measure of the price of railroad support. (See graph on page 484.)
The removal of price controls in 1946 sent wholesale prices shooting upward. In three years the wholesale index had risen to 236.4. The ICC made valiant efforts to keep up with these skyrocketing prices. In June 1946 the Commission approved the first of a series of ten general rate increases embodied in four major proceedings. [Vol. 61:,467 cessful in preserving the 1913 relationship: in 1949 the rate index was 2312, the price index 222.1; in 1950 the rate index was 229.5 and the price index 231A. Considering the normal tendency of regulated and administered prices to lag far behind violent fluctuations in the general price level, the action of the Commission in moving rates up along with prices is eloquent testimony to its sensitivity to railroad interests. The speed of the ICC in increasing freight rates during this period contrasts with its tardiness during the World War I inflation and has ivoked praise from the railroads and envy from other carrier groups regulated by less considerate commissions.
4
The responsiveness of the ICC to rail freight rate demands since it became dependent upon railroad support has been paralleled by its acquiescence to railroad requests for passenger fare, Pullman charge, express rate, and mail pay increases. Only rarely since the middle thirties has the Commission refused a petition for increased passenger fares, and since 1940 the Commission has a perfect record of giving the roads exactly what they have asked for in important passenger fare cases.
7 5 As a result, coach fares in the East have gone up 68.75% and parlor car fares 50% since 1940. This has been enough to place them in some instances above the competitive air fares. Comparable increases requested by the railroads have been approved by the Commission in various other areas of rail pricing. C. 433 (1949) . It is easier for the Commission to approve fare increases than to approve rate increases because the political strength of the opposition is weaker against the former than against the latter. In granting railroad requests for rate and fare increases the ICC has repeatedly come into conflict with other government agencies and non-railroad groups. These fall into three main categories.
Hearings on National Transportation
Shipper interests. These include both private groups and government agencies. The Department of Agriculture has regularly appeared before the Commission in behalf of agricultural interests and either opposed the procedure used by the Commission in considering the railroad request or, as in most cases, opposed outright an increase in rates.
7 7 In 1948 the Department attempted without success to get the ICC to investigate the economy and efficiency of the railroads with a view to determining whether the plea for increased rates was only the result of poor management. 78 Other government agencies which have appeared in opposition to increased rates include the Tennessee Valley Authority, Consumers Counsel for the Bituminous Coal Commission, Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator, General Services Administration, Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Interior.
0 In a 1951 rate case the Attorney General appeared on behalf of the United States in opposition to the interim increase.
80
Price stabilization interests. During and immediately after the Second World War the OPA and the Economic Stabilization Agency frequently came into conflict with the ICC. Under the provisions of the price control acts the authority of these agencies did not extend to prices otherwise subject to federal regulation. The OPA was successful in 1943 in getting the ICC to suspend its previously granted six per cent freight rate increase but not in securing the removal of the ten per cent increase in passenger fares granted at the same time. 537, 554-7 (1946); E.x: Parte No. 163, Increased Express Rates and Charges, 1946, 266 I.C.C. 369, 376-7 (1946) ; Ex Porte No. 168, Increased Freight Rates, 1948 , 272 I.C.C. 695, 703-7 (1948 Ex Porte No. 169, Increased Express Rates and Charges, 1949,277 I.C.C. 249,266-9 (1950) ; EX Porte No. 175, Increased Freight Rates, 1951 , 280 I.C.C. 179, 188 (1951 . Statutory authority for the intervention of the Secretary of Agriculture is § 201 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 36 (1938) . See also 95 CONG. REc A-2002 REc A- -5 (1949 Fares, and Charges, 1942 , 248 I.C.C. 545, 571-4 (1942 ), 255 I.C.C. 357 (1943 . The suspension of the rate increase did not hurt the railroads, which during the war earned higher rates of return on their investment than they had for twenty years previously. Despite this, the members of the Commission were initially divided evenly and Commissioner Eastman had to be recalled temporarily from hig position as Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to break the tie. See 114 further rate increases.
8 2 Throughout most of the war there was a running battle between the OPA and the ICC over the extent to which the ICC in enforcing the Interstate Commerce Act was bound by the policies of the price control acts. A series of Commission decisions and court cases on this question was finally resolved in fdvor of the ICC.s During the present period of price controls the Office of Price Stabilization has resumed the battle with the Commission. It unsuccessfully opposed the 1951 freight rate increases and has also appeared in opposition to a commuter fare rise.
4
State and local interests. The ICC has generally been much more favorable to rate and fare increases than have state and local regulatory bodies. Consequently the Commission has frequently come into conflict with such agencies over the extent to which Commission-approved increases for interstate traffic should be enxtended to intrastate traffic. Under the law the Commission can prescribe rates upon the latter when it finds that the existing rates cause undue, unjust or unreasonable disadvantage to or discrimination against interstate commerce. 8 , State regulatory bodies have jealously defended their jurisdictions against the Commission's efforts to intrude thereon for the benefit of the railroads. 
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Monopoly and Antitrust
The Commission received its principal powers with respect to combinations and competition in the Transportation Act of 1920.8 7 Consequently it was only rarely that it acted in this area while dependent upon shipper and public support. In the few instances in which it did consider problems of monopoly prior to 1920 it was vigorously critical of the ralroads. 88 Its interpretations of the Transportation Act of 1920, on the other hand, have always been colored by its dependence upon railroad support. The Commission has advanced the individual and collective interests of the railroads by facilitating the reduction of competition among them and by aiding their development of cooperative devices designed to increase group solidarity.
In carrying out this necessary consequence of its railroad affiliation, the Commission has repeatedly come into conflict with the Antitrust Division and other groups interested in the maintenance of competition. The Commission early adopted the views of the railroads that collective price-fixing through rate bureaus and conferences was not only necessary and legal but also highly desirable.
8 9 This position conflicts with judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act holding (1) that the act is applicable to carriers regulated by the Commission, and (2) that cooperative price-fixing by competing companies is per se a violation of the antitrust laws. 00 It is, hence, significant that of eleven major antitrust proceedings instituted between 1935 and 1948 by the Department of Justice against carriers subject to ICC regulation, only one, which was against a motor carrier rate bureau, was based upon information referred to the Department by the ICC. 91 In another suit, also against a motor carrier, there was "close cooperation" between the Division and the 
THE MARASMUS OF THE ICC
Commission in the investigation preceding the indictment.0 2 In regard to the railroads, however, the Commission has not turned over to the Department evidence of antitrust violations uncovered in the performance of its duties. At least some members of the Commission, for instance, were aware in 1939 of the activities of the railroads and motor carriers in Central Freight Association Territory which became the basis of a grand jury investigation, subsequently terminated without indictment because of the war.
03 Of considerably greater significance was Commission awareness, if not sponsorship, of the Western Commissioner Agreement in 1932 among the major railroads operating west of the Mississippi. This established elaborate machinery for the settlement of rate disputes among the participant carriers. Members of the ICC were aware of the existence of the agreement during the eleven years it was in force. 94 No attempt was made, however, to discover its provisions in detail or to require it to be filed with the Commision in accordance with Sec. 6(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Justice Department consequently did not learn of it until 1943. It requested a copy from the railroads on April 9th of that year. It got a copy on April 14th. The same day the agreement was filed with the ICC.
9 : Nine days later the participating railroads canceled it. This agreement subsequently became the basis of the Department's Lincoln suit against the Association of American Railroads, the Western Association of Railway Executives, and forty-seven individual carriers.
Going beyond non-cooperation, the Commission has in some instances positively affected the conclusion of antitrust suits by the Government. Since it began to become dependent upon railroad support the Commission has in effect reversed successful antitrust suits by approving under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and thereby exempting from the antitrust laws, practices which had previously been found to be in violation of those laws. 96 sale of the Pullman operating company to the railroads over the objections of the Antitrust Division. 0 9 Also, the approval by the Commission of the Western Traffic Association Agreement after the passage of the ReedBulwinkle Bill has obstructed the Justice Department's suit against the western railroads.08
During the Second World War the ICC and its affiliated agency, the Office of Defense Transportation, endeavored to protect railroad rate bureaus from antitrust prosecution. The Small Business Concerns Act of 1942 authorized the chairman of the War Production Board, after consultation with the Attorney General, to certify to the latter that specified acts of private concerns were approved by him and were "requisite to the prosecution of the war." Such acts would then be immune from attack under the antitrust laws. 9 During 1942 and 1943 the ICC and the ODT engaged in an administrative battle with the Antitrust Division to get the chairman of the WPB to exempt rate bureaus from antitrust prosecutions. The specific issue between the two agencies was whether certain restrictions regulating the practices of the bureaus and proposed by the Division should be written into the WPB certificate. In a much broader sense, the issue was one of competition versus regulated monopoly in railroad rate-making. 10 0 In the end, the two transportation agencies were successful and the certificate was issued with the inclusion of only one minor provision recommended by the Division. 10 ' After the termination of hostilities, the expiration date of the certificate was first fixed for October 1, 1945. However, at the request of ICC Commissioner Johnson, director of the ODT, the life of the certificate was extended another year. Despite renewed requests for further extension a year later, the Civilian Production Administrator permitted it to go out of effect on Oct. 1, 1946.102 In addition to this administrative battle, the ICC lobbied before Congress for legislation to exempt permanently the rate bureaus from the danger of prosecution. Such a bill was introduced by Senator Wheeler in 1943 at the request of the ICC. 10 the same restrictions be written into this measure that it had unsuccessfully urged be included in the WPB certificate. This resulted in a conflict between the two agencies and, since with the issuance of the certificate the issue became temporarily dormant, the legislation was not pushed at that time. Subsequently in the 79th and 80th Congresses the ICC and the railroads renewed their efforts, largely as a result of the Lincoln suit and the decision of the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad.
1 0 4 The Commission in its annual report issued at the beginning of 1945 urged the amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act to authorize itself to regulate carrier associations and to exempt them from the antitrust laws.°1 0 Shortly thereafter Representative Buwinkle introduced a bill designed to accomplish this purpose. The bill was endorsed by the Commission with suggestions for minor changes, 10 6 and ICC representatives testified in its favor at the hearings.
1 0 7 The need for this legislation likewise became more urgent from the Commission's viewpoint when the WPB exemptions certificate expired in 1946.108 In the second session of the 79th Congress and in the 80th Congress the Commission renewed its endorsement of legislation along the lines of the Bulwinkle Bill, and in 1948 it approved the conference report of the bill in the form in which it was finally enacted over the President's veto. Under Sections 5 and 5a of the Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC may approve poolings of carriers, consolidations, mergers, acquisitions of control, and agreements relating to rate and charges, and thereby exempt carriers participating in such actions from the antitrust laws. The policy of the ICC in enforcing these sections has generally coincided with the views of the railroads. It is rare that applications to purchase, merge, or lease railroad lines or to acquire ownership of such lines or to enter into operating agreements with such lines are turned down by the Commission. Applications to permit interlocking directorates are also almost invariably approved." 0 In one significant case concerning the consolidation of eight motor carriers in which it was alleged that there was a railroad interest, the Commission rejected the arguments of the Antitrust Division, the Department of Agriculture and other groups that the Commission ought not approve transactions which would result in an unreasonable restraint of com- petition within the meaning of the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court, oi appeal, sustained the Commission, in a divided decision.
11 In applying the provisions of the Reed-Bulwinkle Bill the ICC has also followed a lenient policy and interpreted broadly the scope of the permissible exemption from the antitrust laws."1 2
Rail-Motor Competition
The affiliation of the ICC with the railroads has resulted in an ambiguous relationship between the Commission and the principal railroad-competitive group, the motor carriers. On the one hand, there is a close affiliation between the motor carrier industry and the ICC's Bureau of Motor Carriers, with the two cooperating in the enforcement of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The Bureau has consequently been praised by the motor carriers and criticized by the railroads. 113 On the other hand, the relationship between the motor carrier industry and the Commission apart from the BMC has been cool and frequently antagonistic. The reason for this is Commission partiality towards the railroads in conflicts of interest between the two carrier groups. The price of railroad affiliation has been motor carrier alienation.
Because a large portion of railroad traffic is non-competitive and must move by rail, the Commission has been able to aid the railroads by permitting selective rate-cutting during periods of intense rail-motor competition such as that from 1935 through 1941. For three years from 1937 to 1940 the Commission required motor carriers to bear the burden of proof in making competitive rate cuts while at the same time not requiring the railroads to do so. This policy was continued after Congress in 1938 amended the Motor Carrier Act to make its provisions concerning burden of proof identical with those applicable to the railroads. 113. Transport Topics, Oct. 11, 25, 1937 , Jan. 31, Oct. 17, 1938 , Feb. 20, July 3, 1939 , March 19, 1945 , Feb. 4, 1946 ,*Jan. 17, 24, Aug. 29, 1949 104 RAILWAY AGa 19 (March 12, 1938) ; 106 id. at 21 (Feb. 11, 1939) , 550 (April 1, 1939) ; 108 id. at 9 (Jan. 13, 1940), 43 (Feb. 24, 1940) Although initially requested by the motor carriers, the subsequent effect of these orders was, as Commissioner Eastman pointed out in one dissent, to substitute a much more difficult procedure for motor carriers wishing t6 lower rates than for railroads.1 n The Commission rejected, however, motor carrier petitions to remedy the situation. 117 Throughout this period the Commission in a number of cases encouraged the railroads to exercise their managerial discretion by meeting motor carrier competition through various devices.
11 8 The injurious effects of proposed railroad competitive rates upon motor carriers were not sufficient cause to invalidate the rates." 0 Railroads were usually permitted to meet motor carrier competition by rate reductions, 120 and to regain by this means traffic which had been lost to the truckers. 121 Relief from the provisions of Section 4 of the Act prohibiting the charging of a higher rate for a short haul than for a longer one was frequently granted the railroads in this connection. [Vol. 61 :467 or discriminatory.ma On the other hand, attempts by the motor carriers to meet railroad competition or to undercut railroads were usually disapproved by the Commission. 4 ICC action in regard to the most heavily competitive commodities was almost invariably favorable to railroads. The most competitive traffic between the two types of carriers was that which had normally up to that time moved at railroad less-than-carload (LCL) ratings. It was openly admitted that railroad rates on this traffic did not cover costs.
12 5 Despite this, the railroads vigorously attempted to keep this traffic from falling to the motor carriers, and in carrying out their program to this end they received the cooperation of the Commission. In 1936 the Commission permitted the railroads to introduce free pick-up and delivery services and in the following four years gave them further assistance.
12 0 The climax of the railroad drive was reached in 1940 when the southern roads filed reduced ratings on some 3,500 commodities and the Commission permitted these changes to go into effect over the most vigorous motor carrier opposition without even suspending them for investigation.
1 27 In the regulation of other highly competitive traffic, such as automobiles, petroleum, and meats ICC actions and policies likewise tended to favor the railroads. 28 Typical of ICC decisions at this time was one important case dealing with naval stores in which the Commission refused to set minimums beyond which the railroads might not go in meeting motor carrier competition.1 2 9
The railroads during this period were frequently permitted to quote competitive rates of a type denied to the motor carriers. The Commission required the truckers to base their rates upon the fully allocated cost (constant and variable costs) theory of rate-making while the railroads were permitted to establish rates upon an added cost basis (variable costs only).
8 0 The railroads were permitted to introduce volume minimum rates (rates applicable only to a minimum volume larger than a carload or trucldoad) ; the same privilege was denied to motor carriers. 131 Similarly, for six years motor carriers were not allowed to utilize all freight rates (rates applicable to carloads of mixed commodities regardless of the latter's classification ratings) while at the same time railroads were permitted to do so.
132 Also, freight forwarders and motor carriers were not allowed to charge joint rates (single rates quoted by two or more participating carriers) nor were motor carriers allowed to charge proportional rates (lower rates on through traffic) on freight forwarder traffic.
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The incidence of ICC policy during these years can be measured by the criticism from the motor carriers.la 4 During the war the situation eased somewhat as there was plenty of traffic for everyone. After the war when the motor carriers again began to cut into railroad business the latter, encouraged by the Commission, commenced a series of competitive rate reductions. Again they received the favor and indulgence of the ICC, and again the motor car- riers felt called upon to protest the "tendency upon the part of the ICC to treat 'public interest' and 'railroad interest' as synonomous terms. ....
-l5
While competitive rate-making has been the single most important field of Commission behavior favoring railroads in their struggle with the motor carriers, other actions and policies of the Commission also deserve mention. In the discussion prior to the passage of the Motor Carrier Act the industry only consented to regulation by the "railroad-minded" ICC on the condition that a separate motor carrier bureau and division be established.' 3 0 These two bodies became the representatives of the industry within the Commission and as such anathemas to the railroads, who consistently urged the Commission to organize itself on a "functional" rather than an "industry" basis. 18 7 In line with these desires the Commission has gradually emasculated the motor carrier units. The division has been stripped of its responsibilities in regard to rates, securities, consolidations, mergers, purchases, accounts, and penalties; the bureau has lost its Section of Traffic, its Section of Accounts, and its functions in connection with motor carrier securities.
13 8 In other fields of activity, the Commission has narrowly interpreted the "grandfather clause" (statutory authorization of operating rights to carriers for bona fide operations on a given date) so as to deny certificates and permits to many operating truck lines. ' When it has approved such rights it has frequently severely restricted them as to the territory or classes of shippers which might be served or the commodities which might be transported. 40 For almost a decade the Commission interpreted the acquisition, certificate, and affiliation clauses of the Interstate Commerce Act in such a manner as to facilitate railroad penetration into the motor carrier industry and to raise genuine fears in the motor carriers as to the extent to which the Commission really wished to preserve 135. Id., May 30, 1949 , April 24, June 19, Aug. 14, 1950 , Feb. 5, 1951  The cumulative result of these ICC policies has been the alienation of the motor carriers from the Commission. Motor carrier criticism of the ICC has been consistent and vigorous.
143 At the end of the war, the truckers seriously considered initiating a drive to free themselves from ICC control.
4
After much discussion and the consideration of alternative plans, the industry now supports the break-up of the ICC into separate regulatory commissions for each type of transportation with an appellate commission to have jurisdiction over controversies involving two or more classes of carriers, the transfer of the executive functions of the ICC to an executive agency, and the further development of a general control over transportation by the Undersecretary of Commerce.
45
Rail-Water Competition
Its affiliation with the railroads has dominated Commission action concerning water carriers and rail-water competition since the middle twenties when the Commission became dependent upon railroad support. Previous to this time the Commission had, with the exception of its administration of the Panama Canal Act, adequately balanced the interests of the two types of carriers.'
46 Beginning in this period, however, the railroads instituted a con-certed competitive drive against the water carriers. In this they had the virtually complete cooperation of the ICC. Thetwenty per cent differential which had been established by the Director General of the railroads during World War I for water rail-competitive rates was reduced to ten or fifteen per cent in a number of cases. 147 The persistent refusal of the railroads to enter into joint rates and through routes with the water carriers was acquiesced in by the Commission despite congressional pressure to the contrary. 48 Where joint rates were established, the participating water carrier was made to bear the full burden of the differential, and the Commission on occasion even permitted the railroad division of the joint rate to be considerably higher than the local rate to the point of interchange, thus virtually penalizing the water carrier for entering into such a relationship.
140 Reversing a previous policy adopted when it was dependent upon farmer and shipper support, the Commission began to permit railroads to charge discriminatory rates on traffic which had a prior or subsequent haul by water.
1 0 Liberal use was made of the provisions of the Fourth Section of the Interstate Commerce Act allowing the ICC to permit railroads to charge a higher rate for a shorter haul than for a longer one, and the Commission frequently granted "flexible" relief permitting the railroads to meet automatically any competitive reductions by the water carriers.'r In many cases, the Commission cooperated S. 1629, S. 1632, S. 1635, supra note 48, at 783-4, 790, 848-59, 1134. 148. Dep't War v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 77 I.C.C. 317 (1923) Hearings on S. 1629, S. 1632, S. 1635, supra note 48, at 786-7. 150. Ex-River Grain from St. Louis to the South, 203 I.C.C. 385 (1934) ; Raw Sugar, New Orleans to Grammercy and Reserve, La., 206 I.C.C. 231 (1935) . Cf. Chattanooga Packet Co. v. Ill. Cent. R., 33 I.C.C. 384 (1915 ), Restriction of Proportional Rates, 161 I.C.C. 113 (1930 ). 151. Pacific Coast Fourth Section Applications, 129 I.C.C. 3 (1927 ), 165 I.C.C. 373 (1930 ), 173 I.C.C. 577 (1931 ), 190 I.C.C. 273 (1932 ), 196 I.C.C. 296 (1933 mittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1356 and H.R. 1668 , 75th CoNa. 3d Sss. 802 (1938 .
A calculation by the Maritime Commission a year later revealed that in 28 recent Fourth Section cases the Commission had granted relief in whole or in part in 25 and had refused relief in 3. UNITD STATES MARITIME CommissioN, EcoNomic SuRvEY OF COASTWWSE AND [Vol. 61:467 with the railroads to evade the statutory requirement that railroads not be allowed to raise depressed rates solely because of the elimination of water competition.
1 2 In approving general rate increases during this period the Commission frequently acquiesced to railroad requests for the exemption from such increases of heavily water-competitive traffic.
1 0 The Commission also showed a marked tendency to permit the railroads to lower rates on highly competitive items, at times such reductions going below the fully compensatory level.'
54 In a series of cases concerning the important citrus fruit movement from Florida the Commission engaged in an administrative duel with the Maritime Commission: each agency successively reducing the rates of the carriers subject to its regulation.
1 5 5 In the one significant instance during this period in which the ICC was called upon to express its views on federal development of the inland waterways, the Commission delivered a report on a proposed Lake Erie-Ohio River canal which was hostile to waterways interests and favorable to the railroads.
5 0
As a result of these policies the water carriers, during the thirties, struggled against the extension over them of the power of the "railroad-minded" ICC. INTERODASTAL SHIPPING 22 (1939) . The Maritime Commission commented on this as follows: "It would seem from these facts that the Interstate Commerce Commission had adopted a liberal policy toward the rail lines in their efforts to capture certain items of traffic moving in the Atlantic and Gulf coastwise trade. Such relief from the operation of the fourth section, in addition to the adjustment of railroad rates on many competitive products at low levels quite apart from fourth section relief, has strengthened the competitive position of the rail lines." See also id. at 19, 23-4, 31.
152. Interstate Commerce Act § 4(2). This %was done by granting only temporary relief from the requirements of the Fourth Section. Consequently when the temporary order eapired the previous rates could be automatically reinstated if the water competition has been eliminated, or if it had not been eliminated, the relief could be extended.
Temporary relief was granted in 35 of the 83 cases mentioned in note 151 .supra where Unlike the motor carriers, they never acquiesced to Commission regulation. This did not ameliorate the antagonism between the water carriers and the Commission, and, again unlike the motor carriers, the water carrier industry never developed affiliations with any significant segment of the ICC. The Commission does not have a separate water carrier division, and, whereas the Bureau of Motor Carriers is the Commission's largest bureau, the Bureau of Water Carriers and Freight Forwarders is one of its smallest. In 1950 this bureau had only twenty-one employees, 6 0 and in addition to its water carrier duties it also supervised the regulation of freight forwarders and rate bureaus. The water carriers have consequently frequently complained that their interests are neglected, but these complaints have not produced any remedies.'°0 The Commission has remained closely affiliated with the railroads.
In applying the provisions of the Transportation Act of 1940 to the inland waterways operators the ICC has continued most of the policies which alienated the barge lines in the 1930's. The Commission is still reluctant to require railroads to enter into through routes and joint rates with the water lines.' 61 In considering complaints initiated in the middle 1930's as to the rail-barge differential under the all-rail rate, the Commission, in the words of the Hoover Commission study, prolonged the proceeding "beyond all reasonable length," and did not reach a decision until July 1948.162 543 (1935) , and railroad control and operation of competing water carriers, Panama Canal Act, 37 STAT. 560 (1912) . In administering § 4 and other provisions dealing with railroad rates, however, the Commission continually had to cotsider rail-water relationships. 437 (1950) .
Hearings on Independent Offices Appropriation
['Vol, 61:467 decision of the Commission rejected requests of water carrier interests for a substantial differential under the rail rate. It held that cost-of-service considerations did not justify differentials at all, but also held that congressional policy embodied in Sec. 307(d) of the Interstate Commerce Act required it to maintain some differential beneficial to the water carriers.
1 C The ICC has also endeavored to permit railroads to maintain rates discriminating against traffic receiving a water haul. In one notable controversy concerning the shipment of e-x-barge grain from Chicago to the east, the Commission's approval of the higher rates charged on such grain was eventually invalidated by the Supreme Court.' 6 5 Despite this action, the Commission has allowed the railroads to maintain similar discriminatory rates on a large volume of traffic, this necessitating further legal action on the part of the water carriers at°T he continued liberality of the Commission in granting Fourth Section relief, particularly for rates established on an "out-of-pocket" cost basis, has likewise evoked severe criticism from waterway interests.16 The Commission's interpretation of the certificate provisions of the 1940 Act has also hamstrung the water carriers in a number of ways.'
While the barge lines have suffered from the Commission's railroad partiality, they have at least been able to stay in business. Such has not been the case with the coastwise and intercoastal carriers. The combination of the war, railroad competition, and the unsympathetic attitude of the ICC has drastically weakened the domestic ocean shipping industry.
1 70 Service was suspended during the war, the traffic went to the rails, and with ICC concurrence it has stayed there. For a year and a half, from the end of the war until July 1947, the War Shipping Administration and the Maritime Coaiimission operated a common and contract carrier service in the intercoastal and coastwise trades. 17 1 The difficulties encountered in this operation made it clear that the resumption of private service would be dependent upon a readjustment of railroad water-competitive rates. Consequently in March 1946 the two maritime agencies asked the Commission to initiate an investigation of these rates. Nine months later the ICC began to comply with this request and instituted the first of five major investigations into water-rail competitive rates. 17 2 The net result of these investigations has been virtually inconsequential. The water carriers have repeatedly been denied substantial relief which would permit them to resume operations on anything remotely tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission with a view to securing a wholesome balance between the several competing forms of transportation on the one hand and the general public interest on the other. It is felt that under the existing organization of the Commission there is a steadily diminishing recognition of the necessity for such a balance, and a continuing tendency to serve the interest of the rail carriers at the expense of the other interests named. At the same time the Commission allowed the railroads to introduce lower increases on water-competitive traffic in their general rate advance cases, and also to put into effect in the last few years new lower rates on highly competitive individual items. 17 4 The result of these policies has been vigorous criticism of the Commission by the alienated water carriers, and various suggestions from them for the reorganization of water carrier regulation." T IV. RAILROAD AFFILIATION AND COMMISSION VIABILITY The pattern of affiliation of the Commission with the railroads described in the preceding pages is the basic reason for the decreasing viability of the Commission. This decline has four significant aspects:
(1) The alienation of non-railroad interest groups. This process has been described in regard to the water carriers and motor carriers. Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litligation, 65 HARv. L. Rnv. [Vol. 61:467
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THE MARASMUS OF THE ICC
Commission is applying the law in a manner not intended by the Congress. In 1940 Congress declared the national transportation policy to include "fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation." Congress also wrote into the acts of 1935 and 1940 various provisions designed to insure that this policy would be carried out. The failure of the Commission to do this has resulted in increased criticism of the Commission in Congress." 0 (4) Passivity and loss of leadership. The general purpose of the railroads during the past quarter century has been first the preservation, and then subsequently, after it had been lost, the restoration of their transportation monopoly. Because of its affiliation with the railroads the Commission has, like them, become a defender of the status quo. To this end it has maintained an outdated, formalistic type of procedure. 80 It has been slow to introduce the most simple and accepted new techniques of modern management.,' It has failed to develop effective devices for representing the public interest. providing that all the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the National Transportation Policy and the revision of the rule of ratemaking to protect motor and water carriers against "umbrella" ratemaking on behalf of the railroads. 54 STAT. 899, 912, 924, 938 (1940 REP. 14-19 (1947) . The Hoover Commission staff report stated (p. 11-24) : "To a remarkable extent the Commission has operated by judicial proceszes, although allowing somewhat more flexibility than is the practice of the courts. Its procedures appear to have become more and more formalized as the volume of its -work has increased, its bar has become organized, and its tradition has grovm:' For criticism of its procedure by motor bus and truck operators, see Hearings on National Transportation Policy, stpra note 27, at 58-9, 146. The Commission procedure in railroad reorganization cases is attacked as "stiff" and "legalistic" in Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization under 182. This deficiency and the manner in which it benefits the railroads is discussed at length in Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARv. L. REv. 542-5 (1949) and Williams, supra note 179, at 1364-6.
It has neglected administrative planning, and has failed to develop a coherent transportation policy aside from that of giving the railroads what they want.
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As a result, it has been slow to recognize and deal with obvious evils, such as the freight classification problem or the question of state limitations on truck sizes and weights. It has also been unable to adjust its thinking and actions to the new demands of an era in which defense considerations are paramount. These failures of the Commission have inevitably led to the formation within the executive branch of a responsible office which can take the lead in national transportation policy and planning. 1 84 Given this situation in regard to the ICC, what, then, is desirable public policy? The independence of a regulatory commission is based upon the premise that this independence will aid it in being objective and impartial. When such a commission loses its objectivity and impartiality by becoming dependent upon the support of a single narrow interest group, obviously the rationale for maintaining its independence has ceased to exist, and it becomes necessary to subordinate this agency to some other agency possessing a broader outlook and a broader basis of political support. It is undoubtedly desirable to have an agency within the federal government affiliated with the railroads and able to represent their interests. It is undoubtedly undesirable to have such an agency independent of all administrative supervision, masquerading as an impartial tribunal, and controlling competing carrier groups. Fortunately the recent reorganization of the Maritime Commission suggests a pattern for application to the ICC.
The Interstate Commerce Commission should be abolished as an independent agency. Its executive functions should be transferred, as the Hoover Commission recommended, to the Secretary of Commerce. The motor and water carriers should be emancipated by dividing the regulatory functions of the ICC among three separate commissions dealing respectively with rail, water, and highway transportation. These three commissions should all be placed within the Department of Commerce in a position similar to that "The outlook of the Commission and its powers must be greater than the interest of the railroads or of that which may affect those interests. It must be as comprehensive as the interest of the whole country." 186 This is not only a norm of public policy; it is also a requisite for administrative viability. The railroads may still, at least in the immediate future, furnish the Commission with powerful political support. But the prolonged failure of the Commission to adhere to the Court's standard must eventually make the Commission unviable and lead to its replacement by other instrumentalities better able to act in the public interest. Transportation 862-7; Transport Topics, Feb. 5, 1951 . Placing the separate commissions in the Department of Commerce would remove the need for an appellate commission since it would be up to the Secretary to define general transportation policies and to resolve differences among the commissions. To leave the separate commissions outside the general policy guidance of the Secretary would be to maintain the exsting artificial distinction and conflict between promotional and regulatory policies. Comiission o-.
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